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'Dicta Observes
From time to time plans and programs are adopted for
the purpose of speeding up the trial of civil cases. The Ohio
Bar Association report of October 16, 1933, mentions the
following:
"A plan to save both time and money in the handling
of civil cases in Common Pleas Court has been adopted by
the Ashtabula County Bar Association. The plan calls for
setting up a Court of Conciliation at which attempts would
be made to settle cases without going to trial, and for trial
of lesser cases before a jury of six instead of twelve. Members
of the Bar Association voted unanimously in favor of the
changes in court procedure rules, which became effective im-
mediately. The plan is to be tried during the September term
of court, and if found successful, will be continued as regular
procedure. Common Pleas Judge Charles R. Sargent is to pre-
side at a court of conciliation for about a week at the opening
of the term. During this time, attorneys handling the various
cases are to meet with the judge to attempt a settlement. Cases
which cannot be settled at that time are definitely marked
for trial. If opposing attorneys agree, the case will be tried
before a jury of six. Once marked for trial on the date set,
the cases will be tried or dismissed for want of prosecution."
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OUTLINE OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
By HORACE N. HAWKINS, JR., of the Denver Bar
rT HE Securities Act of 1933, so entitled in Section 1 of
lact itself, is Title I of Public Statute No. 22 of the
73rd Congress of the United States, and was approved
by the President of the United States and became effective on
May 27, 1933. It may be said to have two general purposes,
first, to regulate the sale of securities which it is proposed to
offer to the general public through the channels of interstate
commerce, and second, to close the mails and the means of
interstate transportation and communication to sales of
securities involving certain condemned practices and methods.
In its broad aspects this legislation would seem to have clear
constitutional sanction, whatever may be thought of the
validity of some of its details.
Insofar as the first purpose of the act is concerned, the
regulation of the interstate sale of securities, it has been called
-with entire aptness-a National Blue Sky Law, and is in-
tended to cover and does cover with respect to interstate com-
merce the same general phases of the business of finance that
typify the subject matter of the modern blue sky law.
The first question that naturally suggests itself is as to
what securities are included within the scope of the regulatory
provisions of the act. The answer is a problem in subtrac-
tion, or perhaps more accurately in elimination, because the
statutory definition of security is intended to be and is so all-
inclusive as to cover any instrument which through commer-
cial usage is known as a security, and it is necessary to examine
Section 3, which deals with exempted securities, and if any
given security is not therein described, it is subject to the terms
of the Securities Act.
Those securities privileged by exemption are as follows:
(1) Any security which, prior to or within 60 days
after the date of the Act (the date of the Act being May 27,
1933) has been sold or disposed of by the issuer (and who
is an "issuer" will be hereinafter discussed) or within such
time bona fide offered to the public; but no new offering
thereof is exempt.
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(2) Domestic Governmental and Municipal securities
and those of domestic governmental instrumentalities and
agencies.
(3) Securities issued by National Banks, Federal Re-
serve Banks, and State Banks the businesses of which are sub-
stantially confined to banking and which are under state
supervision.
(4) Drafts, notes, bills of exchange, and bankers' ac-
ceptances which arise out of or the proceeds of which are to
be used in current transactions, provided they mature in not
exceeding 90 days from the date of issue, or if renewed, are
not renewed for more than that period of time.
(5) Securities of certain charitable corporations, using
that word in the broad sense, which are not operated for
profit.
(6) Securities of building and loan associations and
similar institutions, substantially all the business of which is
confined to making loans to members, provided the issuer
does not deduct more than 3 per cent of the face value of the
security from the total amount paid by a purchaser.
(7) Securities issued by a farmer's cooperative associa-
tion as defined in the Revenue Act of 1932.
(8) Securities issued by a receiver or a trustee in bank-
ruptcy.
(9) Securities issued by a common carrier subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act.
(10) Any insurance, endowment, or annuity policy or
contract issued by a corporation subject to state supervision.
( 11 ) Such other classes of securities, where the amount
offered to the public does not exceed $100,000, as the Federal
Trade Commission shall declare exempt by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the offer-
ing. No additional class of security has as yet been declared
exempt by the Federal Trade Commission.
Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of inter-
est in property, tangible or intangible, or any other instru-
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ment commonly known as a security, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing, which is not also described in the
foregoing eleven exempt classes, is a security within the mean-
ing of the Securities Act of 1933.
Every transaction concerning a security embraced within
the meaning of that term as used in the Act, does not, how-
ever, call for compliance with the regulatory requirements
thereof. Certain classifications of entities, actual and fictional,
are recognized. The Act defines a "person" as that term is
used therein as including individuals, corporations, partner-
ships, associations, joint stock companies, unincorporated as-
sociations, governments and political subdivisions thereof,
and trusts the beneficial interests wherein are evidenced by a
security.
"Persons" in turn, are, unless the context of the Act
otherwise requires, divided into and considered as belonging
to the following classes: (1) issuers, (2) underwriters, (3)
dealers, and (4) persons other than issuers, underwriters and
dealers.
An "issuer" is any person who issues or proposes to issue
any security or who guarantees the same either as to principal
or income; except that with respect to certificates of deposit,
voting trust certificates, collateral trust certificates, or certifi-
cates of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment
trust not having a board of directors or persons performing
similar functions or of the fixed, restricted management or
unit type, "issuer" means the person performing the duties
of depositor or manager; and except that with respect to such
securities as equipment-trust certificates "issuer" means the
person by whom the property is to be used.
An "underwriter" is any person who has purchased
from an issuer or from any person controlling or controlled
by or under common control with the issuer, a security with
a view to the distribution thereof, or who sells a security for
an issuer or for any person controlling or controlled by or
under common control with the issuer, in connection with the
distribution thereof, or who participates in or in the under-
writing of either of such undertakings, but the term "under-
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writer" does not include one whose interest is limited to the
receipt from an underwriter or dealer of the usual and cus-
tomary distributors' or sellers' commission.
A "dealer" is any person engaged in the business of deal-
ing in securities issued by another person.
Having in mind the foregoing classifications of persons,
there are seven classes of transactions with respect to securities
of the kind otherwise included within the regulatory features
of the Securities Act, which are not governed by such regula-
tions solely on account of the nature of such transactions, and
they are as follows:
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter or dealer,
(2) transactions by an issuer not through or with an
underwriter and not involving a public offering,
(3) transactions by a dealer subsequent to one year
after the last date on which the security was offered to the
public by the issuer or through an underwriter, provided such
transactions are not with reference to securities constituting
any part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such
dealer as a participant in the distribution thereof by the issuer
or by or through an underwriter,
(4) brokers' transactions executed on customers' orders
on any exchange or in the open or counter market,
(5) the issuance of a security of a person which is ex-
changed, without remuneration, to existing security holders
exclusively,
(6) the issuance of securities to existing security holders
or creditors of a corporation in the process of reorganization
under court supervision, and
(7) preliminary negotiations and agreements between
issuer and underwriter.
If any given security comes within the broad statutory
definition of "security" and does not come within any of the
hereinbefore mentioned eleven classes of exempted securities,
certain acts are forbidden and made unlawful except in the
negotiation or consummation of the seven types of transac-
tions just mentioned, unless the registration provisions of the
Act hereinafter discussed are corhplied with. These acts, so
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forbidden in the absence of effective registration, are as fol-
lows:
(1) To use any means of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce to sell or to offer to buy (and
note this restriction on a purchaser) such security.
(2) To carry or cause to be carried in interstate com-
merce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery
after sale.
(3) To use the mails to sell or offer to buy (again the
restriction on the purchaser) such security or as a carrier of
or for such security for the purpose of sale or delivery after
sale, except where the issue of which such security is a part is
sold only to residents of a single state and where the issuer is
a resident of and doing business within, or, if a corporation,
incorporated and doing business within, such state.
In order to use the mails and other means of transporta-
tion and communication in the interstate sale of non-exempt
securities, if such sales do not come within the exempted
classes of transactions hereinbefore noted, a registration state-
ment must be in effect with regard to such securities.
Registration is accomplished by filing a registration
statement in triplicate with the Federal Trade Commission,
and at least one of such copies must be signed by each issuer,
its principal executive officers, its principal financial officer, its
principal accounting officer, and the majority of its board of
directors or persons performing similar functions, or if neither
board of directors nor similar functionaries exist, by the ma-
jority of the persons or board having the power of manage-
ment of the issuer, and if the issuer is a foreign or territorial
person the statement must also be signed by its United -States
representative; however, if the issuer is a foreign government
or political subdivision thereof, the statement need only be
signed by the underwriter of the security. When the state-
ment is filed, a fee of one one-hundredth of one per cent of
the aggregate price at which the securities are to be offered
must be paid, with a minimum fee fixed at $25.00.
The Act prescribes thirty-two items which must appear
in a registration statement or in documents accompanying
the same when relating to a security other than one issued by
a foreign government or political subdivision thereof, and
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fourteen items are so required when the statement relates to a
security issued by a foreign government or political subdi-
vision thereof. The Federal Trade Commission is given the
power to provide that any such information or document
need not be furnished in respect to any class of issuers or
securities if it considers the same inapplicable to that class and
that disclosures adequate to the protection of investors are
elsewhere required in the statement.
If the statement names any accountant, engineer, or ap-
praiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to his
statement, as having prepared or certified any part of the regis-
tration statement, or as having prepared a report or valuation
for use in connection therewith, such person's written consent
must be filed with the registration statement. If any such per-
son is named as having prepared or certified a report or valua-
tion (other than a public official document or statement)
used in connection with the registration statement, but is not
named as having prepared or certified the same for use in con-
nection therewith, the written consent of such person must
be filed with the registration statement unless the Federal
Trade Commission dispenses with such filing as impracticable
or an undue hardship on the registration applicant.
The Commission is also given authority to by rule or
regulation require other information and documents to be in-
corporated in or filed with the registration statement.
A registration statement becomes effective on the twen-
tieth day after it is filed, except in the case of a foreign public
authority which is not in default in its obligations in the
United States, which becomes effective seven days after it is
filed, but if an amendment thereto is filed prior to the effec-
tive date the statement is considered filed when such amend-
ment is filed, with a consequent postponement of effective
date. However, if the amendment is filed with the consent or
pursuant to an order of the Commission, it is treated as part
of the registration statement and does not delay the effective
date thereof.
If the Federal Trade Commission considers a registration
statement incomplete or inaccurate, it may after notice not
later than ten days after the filing thereof and after oppor-
tunity for a hearing not later than ten days from such notice,
issue an order prior to the effective registration date refusing
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to permit the statement to become effective until amended.
When the statement is amended in accordance with the order
the Commission shall so declare, and the registration shall
become effective on the twentieth day following the original
filing or on the date of such declaration, whichever is later.
Amendments filed after the effective registration date be-
come effective on such dates as the Commission may deter-
mine.
The Commission is given authority, at any time it ap-
pears to it that a registration statement includes any untrue
statement of fact or omits to state any fact required to be stated
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
after notice and opportunity for hearing within fifteen days
after such notice, to issue a stop order suspending the effective-
ness of the registration statement. When the statement is
amended in accordance with the stop order the Commission
shall so declare and the stop order shall thereupon cease to
be effective.
The Federal Trade Commission is empowered to make
an examination in any case to determine whether a stop order
should issue.
The notices required to be given by 'the Commission are
to be given to the issuer, or in case of a foreign government or
political subdivision thereof, to the underwriter, or in case of
a foreign or territorial person, to its United States Representa-
tive, and such notices may be effected either by personal service
or by telegraphic notice directed to the address given in the
registration statement.
Orders of the Commission may be reviewed at the in-
stance of any person aggrieved thereby, by filing a petition to
set aside or modify any such order in the Circuit Court of
Appeals of any circuit wherein the petitioner resides or has
his principal place of business, or in the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, within sixty days after the date of
the order. The petition is served upon the Commission and
that body files in response a transcript of the record uponj
which the order was entered. The Court of Appeals in such
review may consider only such objections as were urged before
the Commission, and that body's findings of fact, if sup-
ported by the evidence are conclusive. Provision is made for
the taking of additional material evidence if reasonable
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grounds for failure to introduce the same at the hearing be-
fore the Commission exist, and for modification of its findings
by the Commission itself on the basis of such additional evi-
dence. The judgment or decree of the Court of Appeals is
final, subject, however, to review by the Supreme Court on
certiorari or certification under sections 239 and 240 of the
Judicial Code. Commencement of a proceeding for review
does not operate as a stay of the order complained of unless
the court so orders.
After effective registration of a security is accomplished,
contracts for the sale and disposition thereof, attempts and
offers to dispose of and the solicitation of offers to buy the
same or any interest therein, must be negotiated and carried
on in compliance with the terms of the Act unless such trans-
actions are within the exempted classes of transactions herein-
before discussed or are wholly intrastate to the extent that no
registration is required to engage therein. The terms of the
Act with respect to these matters forbid the use of the mails
or of any other means of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce to carry any communication offering a
registered security for sale, unless such communication meets
the requirements of a statutory prospectus as prescribed by
section 10 of the Act. This provision, however, does not
apply if prior to such communication the person to whom it
is made has received a statutory prospectus from the person
making the communication or his principal, and does not
apply to a communication which states from whom a statu-
tory prospectus may be obtained and does no more than
identify the security and state the price thereof and by whom
orders will be executed. The Act also forbids any person,
in the same circumstances under which the last mentioned
prohibition obtains, to carry or cause to be carried through
the mails or in interstate commerce any registered security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale unless it is accom-
panied or preceded by a statutory prospectus.
The statutory prospectus prescribed by section 10 of
the Securities Act is required to contain the same statements
made in the registration statement, with certain exceptions.
However, if the prospectus is used more than thirteen months
after the effective registration date of the statement, the in-
formation therein contained must be of a date not more than
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twelve months prior to such use. Such other matters required
to be in the registration statement may also be omitted from
the prospectus as the Commission by rule or regulation so
permits, and, conversely, the Commission may require by
regulation the inclusion in the prospectus of information in
addition to that required by the terms of the statute. If a
prospectus consists of a radio broadcast, copies thereof must
be filed with the Commission. The Commission is given
broad powers to classify and prescribe the forms of prospec-
tuses, and to require the filing with it of specimens or forms
thereof.
The teeth in the Securities Act of 1933 consist, apart
from the penalties prescribed for its violation, in the pro-
visions imposing civil liabilities on account of false or mis-
leading registration statements, prospectuses and communica-
tions.
If any part of a registration statement at the time it be-
comes effective contains an untrue statement of material fact,
or omits to state a material fact which is required to make
such statements as are made not misleading, any person ac-
quiring the security to which the registration relates, unless
he knew of such untrue statement or omission (and the
burden of so proving is on defendants), may sue every person
who signed the registration statement; every person who was
a director or similar functionary of, or partner in the issuer
at the time such part of the registration statement was filed;
every person who with his consent is named in the registra-
tion statement as about to become a director or similar func-
tionary, or about to become a partner; every underwriter of
such security; and every accountant, engineer or appraiser, or
person whose profession gives authority to his statements,
provided he has with his consent been named in the registra-
tion statement as having certified or prepared any part there-
of, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation
used in connection therewith-this last class of potential de-
fendants, however, are liable only if the untruth or omis-
sion occurs in the part of the statement, report, or valuation
which purports to have been prepared or certified by them.
All who may be so sued are jointly and severally liable, and
any person who by stock ownership, agency, agreement with
those who have stock ownership or agency, or otherwise, con-
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trols any person who may be so sued as aforesaid, is also liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person.
In such suit no statutory affirmative defense is available
to the issuer other than that the person acquiring the security
knew at the time he acquired the same of the untruth or
omission complained of.
If liability is asserted against one, other than the issuer,
by virtue of his having with his consent been named in some
part of the registration statement as acting or agreeing to act
in some office, capacity or relationship, he may plead as a
defense that before the effective date of that part of the state-
ment he had resigned from or refused to act in every such
office, capacity or relationship and had advised the issuer and
the Commission of such action and that he would not be re-
sponsible for that part of the statement, and he may also
plead as a defense that such part of the statement became effec-
tive without his knowledge and that upon becoming aware of
such fact he forthwith resigned or refused to act and advised
the Commission as aforesaid, and that he also gave reason-
able public notice that such part of the statement had become
effective without his knowledge.
When liability is asserted against one other than an is-
suer with regard to part of a registration statement not pur-
porting to be made on the authority of an expert, nor to be
a copy of or extract from an expert's report or valuation, nor
to be made on the authority of a public official document,
such person may allege and prove as a defense that after rea-
sonable investigation he had reasonable ground to and did
believe at the time that part of the statement became effective,
that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required therein or necessary
to make the same not misleading.
A person other than an issuer sued on account of an
alleged untruth or omission in part of a registration statement
purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert or to
be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself
as an expert has two affirmative defenses, first, that after rea-
sonable investigation he had reasonable grounds to and did
believe, at the time such part of the statement became effective,
that the statements therein were true and that there was no
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omission to state any fact required therein or necessary to
make the same not misleading, and, second, that such part of
the registration statement did not fairly represent his state-
ment as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from
his report or valuation.
A defendant, other than an issuer, from whom recovery
is sought on the ground of an untruth or omission in any part
of a registration statement purporting to be made on the au-
thority of an expert (other than himself) or to be a copy of
or extract from a report or valuation of an expert (other than
himself), may avoid liability by showing that he had reason-
able grounds to and did believe, at the time such part of the
statement became effective, that the statements therein were
true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required therein or necessary to make the same not misleading,
and that such part of the registration statement fairly repre-
sented the statement of the expert or was a fair copy of or
extract from his report or valuation.
Where the asserted liability is against one other than an
issuer, and is based on an untruth or omission in any part of
a registration statement purporting to be a statement made
by a public official or to be a copy of or extract from a public
official document, the defendant may exculpate himself by
showing that he had reasonable ground to and did believe at
the time such part of the statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission
to state a material fact required therein or necessary to make
the same not misleading, and that such part of the registra-
tion statement fairly represented the public officer's statement
or was a fair copy of or extract from the public official docu-
ment.
In determining what constitutes reasonable investiga-
tion and reasonable grounds for belief, the statute prescribes
the standard of reasonableness required of a person occupying
a fiduciary relationship.
If a person becomes an underwriter of a security after the
part of the registration statement with respect to which his
liability is asserted has become effective, that part of the state-
ment is considered effective as to him as of the date he became
such underwriter, insofar as it affects his affirmative defenses
based on any grounds other than his resignation from any
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and all offices, capacities, and relationships in which he is in
the registration statement stated to be acting or to have agreed
to act in.
The suit which may be so brought on account of any
such untruth or omission in the registration statement may be
to recover the consideration paid for the security, plus inter-
est thereon, less any income therefrom, upon tender of the
security, or it may be for damages if the plaintiff no longer
owns the security; but in no case may the recovery exceed the
price at which the security was offered to the public. The
action must be instituted within two years after the discovery
of the untrue statement or omission or after such discovery
should by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been made,
but in no event may it be brought more than ten years after
the security was offered to the public.
In addition to the foregoing liability for untruth or
omission in the registration statement, liability is also incurred
to the purchaser of a security by the seller thereof, to the ex-
tent of the consideration paid therefor plus interest thereon,
less any income thereon, upon the tender of such security, or
for damages if the purchaser no longer owns the security, by
selling such security by methods or means or in circumstances
under which it is required to be registered when the same is
not registered, by selling the same in violation of the pro-
visions of the act relative to the required use of a statutory
prospectus, and by selling the same by the use of any means
of transportation or interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or communication which includes an
untrue material statement or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the same not misleading, if the pur-
chaser did not know of such untruth or omission. It is a de-
fense to such a suit brought on account of untruth or omis-
sion in a prospectus or communication to prove that defend-
ant did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known of the untruth or omission. If the action is
based on a forbidden transaction with an unregistered security
which should have been registered, or on a failure to comply
with the requirements of the Act relative to the required use
of a statutory prospectus, it must be commenced within two
years from the date of the violation of the Act. If the suit is
brought on account of untruth or omission in the prospectus
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or communication by which the sale was effected, it must be
brought within two years from the discovery thereof or from
the date when such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, and in any event within ten
years from the date the security was offered to the public.
Any agreement or stipulation by any person acquiring
any security to waive any of the provisions of the Act or of
the rules and regulations of the Federal Trade Commission is
declared void by the Act, and the rights and remedies created
or conferred by its terms are declared to be in addition to all
other existing rights and remedies.
United States District Courts and State Courts are given
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce duties and liabilities created
by the Act, and no suit brought under the Securities Act in
any State Court may be removed to the Federal Court. In
suits in the Federal District Courts service of process may lie
had out of the district where the action is pending. The Act
expressly provides that nothing therein shall affect the juris-
diction of the Securities Commission, or any agency or officer
performing like functions, of any state or territory, or the
District of Columbia, over any security or person.
The enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 is com-
mitted entirely to the Federal Trade Commission which, in-
cidentally, has established a securities division as part of the
mechanism of carrying out its statutory duties. The Com-
mission is given broad and extensive power to enact rules and
regulations to effectuate the purpose of the Act, and it and its
members are authorized to administer oaths, subpoena wit-
nesses and, generally, to conduct any investigation which it
believes proper and in the public interest and desirable in
securing compliance with the terms of the Act. The Commis-
sion is given authority to apply for and obtain permanent
and temporary injunctions or restraining orders without
bond, and the United States District Courts are expressly
given jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus upon applica-
tion therefor by the Commission commanding any person to
comply with the Securities Act, or with any order of the
Commission. All hearings before the Commission are public
and records thereof are required to be kept. In case any per-
son refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the Commission,
that body may apply to any United States District Court for
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an order requiring such person to appear before the Commis-
sion, or one of its Examiners, and a failure to obey such court
order may be punished as contempt. The privilege of refusing
to testify before the Commission on the ground that the testi-
mony required may tend to incriminate the witness is abro-
gated by the statute which provides, however, that no indi-
vidual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or for-
feiture for or on account of any matter concerning whici he
is compelled to testify after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination. It is made unlawful to make or
cause to be made to any prospective purchaser of a security
any representation that the registration of a security or the
non-issuance of a stop order is a finding by the Commission
that the registration's statement is true and accurate on its
face, or that it does not contain an untrue statement of fact, or
omit to state a material fact, or that the Commission has in
any way passed upon the merits of, or given approval to, such
security.
The second purpose of the Securities Act is effectuated
by Section 17 thereof. Under this section, it is unlawful for
any person in the sale of any securities, and securities as used
in this section include the eleven types of security exempt from
the registration features of the Act, by the use of any means
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce,
or by the use of the mails directly or indirectly, ( 1 ) to employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or, (2) to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact, or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit-upon
the purchaser. The same section of the Act also declares it to
be unlawful for any person, by transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce, or by the use of the mails, to
publish or circulate any communication which, though not
purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security
for a consideration from an issuer, underwriter or dealer,
without disclosing the receipt, past or prospective, of such
consideration, and the amount thereof.
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Any person who wilfully violates any provision of the
Act, or. the rules or regulations of the Commission, or who
wilfully in a registration statement makes any untrue state-
ment of a material fact, or omits to state any material fact
required to be stated therein, or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading, upon conviction, is to be fined
not more than Five Thousand Dollars, or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Acting under the authority of the Securities Act, the
Federal Trade Commission, on July 6, 1933, promulgated
its initial rules and regulations. These regulations provide the
details for the conduct of business with the Commission by
applicants-for registration, and other parties, and prescribe a
form of registration statement. They also set forth certain
requirements as to the contents of a prospectus, and forbid the
use of any prospectus until five copies of the form thereof have
been filed with the Commission. If the prospectus is a radio
broadcast, it must be reduced to writing, and five copies
filed with the Commission at least five days before the same
is broadcast. The Commission has not as yet prescribed all
the forms which will eventually be required to administer the
Securities Act, and the official statement accompanying the
rules and regulations announces that the Commission realizes
that the rules, regulations and forms published on July 6, as
aforesaid, are experimental only, pending actual working ex-
perience with the Act, and will be subject to revision from
time to time, as experience proves the advisability of changes.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
The Detroit Bar Association during the past year has been ex-
tremely active in its attempt to curb the unauthorized practice of law.
It has instituted suits to enjoin the American Life Insurance Company,
Detroit Trust Company, Reliance Legal Agency, a collection agency,
and others from practicing law. The Detroit Bar Quarterly for Octo-
ber, 1933, contains a half page notice requesting all members of the bar
to report to the members of the Unauthorized Practice of the Law Com-
mittee, all evidence of ambulance chasing, practice by laymen before
Circuit Court Commissioners and the Industrial Accident Board, by
notaries public, by collection agencies, by automobile clubs, etc., and
as to attorneys rendering legal services in connection with advertise-
ments and newspapers, etc., including so-called "Legal Advice" columns.
OUTLINE OF THE NEW TAX AT SOURCE
ON DIVIDENDS
ECTION 213 of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which became effective on June 16, 1933, imposes upon
the receipt of dividends, which are required to be in-
cluded in the gross income of the recipient under the Revenue
Act of 1932, by any person other than a domestic corpora-
tion, an excise tax of five per cent of the amount of such divi-
dends. The tax is required to be deducted and withheld from
the dividends by the payor corporation. Dividends declared
before the date of the Act are not subject to the tax. The tax
does not apply to dividends of any corporation which is itself
exempt from income tax under the Revenue Act of 1932.
The corporation required to deduct and withhold any
tax is under the duty, on or before the last day of the month
following the payment of the dividend, to make a return
thereof and pay such tax to the Collector of Internal Revenue
of the District in which its principal place of business is lo-
cated, or, if it has no principal place of business in the United
States, to the Collector at Baltimore, Maryland. The payor
corporation, under the Act, is made liable for the tax, and it is
by the statute indemnified against the claims and demands
of any person for the amount of any payment made in ac-
cordance with the terms thereof.
On July 14, 1933, there was issued by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Acting
Secretary of the Treasury, Treasury Decision No. 4372,
which constitutes the rules and regulations for the administra-
tion and collection of the tax at source on dividends. Under
these regulations, the Departmental view is stated to be that
the tax does not apply to dividends declared before midnight,
June 15, 1933, and the position is also taken that where a
corporation leases property of another corporation, and in
consideration thereof agrees, among other things, to pay as
rental certain amounts in installments directly to the lessor's
shareholders, such payments, for the purpose of Section 213,
constitute dividends to the recipients, received as from the
lessor corporation. The lessee is regarded as the payor cor-
poration, and is required to make the returns and withhold
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and pay the taxes, in respect of such dividends. A declaration
of dividends payable periodically in the future is regarded as
void under Section 213, unless the corporation at the time of
such declaration had sufficient profits, accumulated subsequent
to February 28, 1913, to enable it to pay all such future divi-
dends, and an attempt to bind a corporation to pay future
dividends out of anticipated earnings is not regarded as a valid
declaration of dividends.
The regulations also commit the Bureau to what would
seem to be a proper construction of the statute with regard to
the making of returns, in that under such regulations a cor-
poration is not required to make any return of non-payment
of dividends, but is simply required to make a return when
it is required to pay a tax, that is, on or before the last day
of the month following the month in which the dividends
were paid. The regulations also prescribe the form of the re-
turn to be made by the payor corporation, and forms of
exemption certificates for use in cases where it is claimed that
the recipient of the dividends is not liable to the tax in ques-
tion, and prescribe the method by which such claim of exemp-
tion shall be established.
"The time is approaching when we shall not be warranted in
excusing our judicature for its defects on the ground that the legislature
has virtually monopolized control over the processes of justice. As an
argument for obtaining for the courts a larger part in formulating modes
of procedure criticism of statutory rules has served a purpose. But
would it not be reasonable to ask ;the judiciary to take stock of existing powers and
inaugurate such reforms as are possible on a sound basis of constitutional authority?
There has been insufficient thinking in this field.
"When the bar, a generation too late, awoke to the evils of lay competition,
there was an instinctive turning to the legislators for more laws, but soon it became
apparent that the judicial branch already had the remedies on the shelf ready to be
dispensed. The acceptance of responsibility for adequate legal training before admission
had already manifested itself in a number of states.
"Why have supreme courts been so timid in the use of rule-making power?
The answer is found in the uncertainty of tenure of most supreme court judges and
the lack of an integrated organization of the judicial branch. We have made a slow
-approach to the essential question whether judges are bound to permit justice to be
defeated through an inappropriate legislated rule of procedure. Can they justify them-
selves by passing the buck to the legislature, an essentially irresponsible body?"




The Editor of The Colorado Graphic says she likes Casey better
than she likes us. All right for her!
She also gave publicity to the fact we had paid our UR tax, thus
giving our creditors wind of a potential income on our part. No doubt
lots of garnishee process have reached the State Treasurer by the time
this sees the light of print. (We mix our own metaphors.)
THE CONSTITUTION STILL WAIVES
It is bruited about that in Walker us. Bedford, the Supreme Court
announced its fixed purpose to waive not so much as a word of the
constitution. It is also reported that after reading the Attorney Gen-
eral's petition for rehearing the Court will announce a rule that it will
not even waive a misprint in the constitution.
IT OUGHT TO WORK BOTH WAYS
The courts have appealed to the bar to protect them against the
vigorous onslaughts of the press. The bar is willing, provided the
courts will keep the press off the lawyers' necks.
Incidentally, and most important of all, to whom should the
lawyers appeal to keep the judges from making vigorous onslaughts
on them?
MONA LISA
Charles B. Ladds, of the Colorado Springs Bar, presents a mo-
tion to Moses Hallett, Chief Justice, at Colorado Springs. Mr. Ladds
used a goose quill pen, which he would dip into a bottle of ink,
securing as much ink as he possibly could, and would then smear it
over the paper.
Hallett, C. J.: Will you let me see that motion.
Mr. Ladds handed the motion to the judge, who looked at it for
a minute or two, and without regarding Mr. Ladds at all, turned
to the clerk and said: "Mr. Clerk, will you hand that to Mr. Ladds and
ask him to paint it over again."
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CONTEMPT IN PITKIN COUNTY
Before Warner Root, J. P., Pitkin County, appeared for the plain-
tiff Porter Plumb, Esq., and for the defendant the late Judge and
quondam Congressman T. A. Rucker.
Plumb: Rucker, you are a danined liar.
Rucker floors Plumb with a chair, and the justice fines each $5
for contempt. Plumb paid, but Rucker begged the indulgence of the
court until the following morning, which being granted, the trial pro-
ceeded.
That night Rucker and others indulged in a poker game, and
Root, J. P., having lost all his chips, begged Rucker, who was playing
in good luck, to lend him some chips. Rucker said, "Not on your
life, but I will pay you that fine," and pushed over chips representing
the value of $5. The justice proceeded to lose these back to Rucker,
and the next morning entered in his docket an order to the effect that
on ample apologies from Rucker, the fine had been remitted.
CONTEMPT IN YE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
Thomas J. O'Donnell: Your Honor's ruling is a travesty on
justice.
Justice of the Peace Gavin: For that remark you will be fined
$100, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell: For another hundred, I'll repeat it.
THE GOOD OLD 8TH CIRCUIT DAYS
Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on
division of $8000 counsel fees in a ba~nkruptcy matter.
Counsel: Your Honors, we are here because we have been unable
to agree on the division of the fee.
Trieber, J.: It was always the opinion of the Court that when
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act, it was intended that the creditors
should get some of the money.
Arthur H. Laws has been appointed as an additional member
of the Grievance Committee of the Denver Bar Association.
"I conclude then that the thirty thousand shares issued to Powell
were issued for a consideration that lacked the quality of consideration
exacted by the Constitution of this state, and were therefore issued
without consideration." Blair vs. F. H. Smith Company, 156 Att. 207.
PROCEDURE-REFERENCE-ACCOUNTING--H. C. Lallier Construc-
tion and Engineering Company vs. Morrison-No. 12936-De-
cided September 25, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of
any long account on either side, a reference is proper under the authority
of the Code of Civil Procedure, but an interlocutory order that either
side is or is not entitled to an accounting is not a condition precedent
to the reference, and the reference is not premature under such cir-
cumstances.
2. Where the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud or misconduct
toward the defendant but without depriving defendant of its under-
lying rights or causing any injury, the doctrine that plaintiff did not
come into court with clean hands was not available as a defense.-
Judgment affirmed.
NEGLIGENCE - PLEADING- SUFFICIENCY - INVITEES - LANDLORD
AND TENANT-JOINT TORTFEASORS-NUISANCE-INSTRUC-
TIONS--Gilligan vs. Blakesley-No. 13308-Decided September
25, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption and in-
ference to sustain a pleading where the opposing party has failed to em-
ploy the remedies intended by the Code of Civil Procedure, such as mo-
tions and special deinurrer, to effect greater certainty and directness in
the pleading.
2. A patient, entering rooms rented to a physician for the pur-
pose of being used by him as his professional office, is not only the
invitee of the tenant but also of the landlord.
3. Introduction into evidence of the mortality table (Sec. 6537
C. L. 1921) is not a prerequisite to recovery on a claim for perma-
nent injury due to negligence.
4. Fact that a physician, in whose office a patient was injured
due to defective condition of the premises, paid part of the damages
claimed by the patient, does not release the landlord, since there was
no allegation nor evidence that the physician was a joint tortfeasor.
5. Instruction approved which stated the circumstances under
which a landlord was liable to a patient injured by defective condition
of premises rented to a physician for professional use.
6. A dangerous condition which amounts to a nuisance, if created
by the owner in the form of a palpable defect in the construction of a
building, may render the owner liable irrespective of the question of
negligence.-Judgment affirmed.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-DAMAGES IN LIEU THEREOF-UNCLEAN
HANDS--Kern vs. Campbell-No. 13373-Decided October 2,
1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Prior to November 5, 1927, Campbell was owner of land in Routt
County, upon which a trust deed of $1,000 had been foreclosed and
Kern became the owner of trustee's certificate of purchase. Campbell
filed his complaint in 1931 claiming that on November 5, 1927, he
entered into a contract with Kern's husband acting as agent to pur-
chase the certificate of purchase for $1,148.69 and interest, and that
Kern was to assign the certificate of purchase. He claimed to have made
all the payments and that the certificate of purchase was assigned to
him, but delivered to one George J. Humbert in escrow; that at the
time of making the agreement he was placed in possession. That there-
after Kern obtained from Humbert the certificate of purchase and erased
his name from same and procured a trustee's deed to the property and
contends that the deed from the Public Trustee was obtained through
fraud and that the title was held in trust for the plaintiff. Later Kern
borrowed $650 and secured same by deed of trust on the land and used
the money to pay delinquent taxes. Judgment below denying specific
performance and awarding plaintiff the full purchase price amounting
to $1,232.69.
1. There are exceptions to the general rule that the finding of
the trial court on conflicting testimony is conclusive upon the Supreme
Court.
2. Where it appears from the record that material exhibits have
been altered by both parties to the litigation, the cause comes within
the exception to the foregoing rule.
3. Where the real issue in a case turns on the question as to
whether or not there have been material alteration in exhibits intro-
duced, the Supreme Court is as well able to pass on the force and weight
of such evidence as is the lower court.
4. Where it appears in a suit for specific performance or for dam-
ages in lieu thereof that both plaintiff and defendant are not in court
with clean hands, the plaintiff is not entitled to the full measure of
relief that he otherwise might be entitled to.
5. In this case the judgment should be modified by deducting
from the full purchase price paid by plaintiff the $650 borrowed by
the defendant for the purpose of paying delinquent taxes and expenses.
-- Judgment affirmed as to that part denying specific performance, but
money judgment modified as above.
DIVORCE-DISMISSAL WITHOUT CONSENT OF DEFENDANT'S AT-
TORNEY-PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL FEES AS CON-
DITION PRECEDENT-Frederick vs. Frederick-No. 12957-
Decided October 2, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Plaintiff brought suit for divorce against his wife in County Court.
Wife consulted an attorney advising him that she was without funds
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and would be unable to support herself and minor child and could not
pay attorney's fees. Attorney advised her generally as to her rights and
that on proper showing the Court would require her husband to make
suitable support provisions and pay reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
The attorney got into immediate touch with plaintiff's attorney, but
they were unable to adjust the matter. Court hearing on these prelimi-
nary matters was arranged and defendant advised her attorney to do
nothing further, but her attorney went to court and resisted plaintiffs
dismissal until he was compensated. The Court entered conditional dis-
missal provided that the defendant's attorney was paid $50 and docket
fee. Court below denied plaintiff's application to vacate the order allow-
ing counsel's fees.
1. Where a husband initiates a divorce suit, the wife without
means of her own is entitled to consult counsel and where the wife has
employed an attorney and the attorney has not been compensated for
his reasonable services, it is proper for the court to refuse to permit the
plaintiff to dismiss the suit except upon the plaintiff's payment to de-
fendant's attorney the reasonable value of his services.
2. Plaintiff's conclusion to withdraw the charges against his wife
is commendable, but it did not operate to discharge his full obligation.
He, not his wife, nor her counsel, initiated the act which gave rise to
the reasonable added burden of his folly. The court below properly re-
tains control of the case for the purpose of seeing that the plaintiff dis-
charged his obligation in full by compensating his wife's attorney. This
in no manner interfered with a reconciliation of the parties.-Judgment
affirmed.
HOMESTEADS-EXEMPTIONS-WAIVER AND ABANDONMENT OF-
Reed vs. The State Savings Bank-No. 12535-Decided October
2, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
One of the plaintiffs, B. K. Reed, was a householder in the City
of Colorado Springs and the head of a family and the husband of
Cornelia Reed. B. K. Reed owned a dwelling referred to as A which
he and his family occupied as a residence. The Reeds homesteaded it
by a proper entry on the margin of the record title and continued to
occupy it as a residence until 1926 when they removed to another
dwelling owned by them in Colorado Springs referred to as B and
moved their furniture therein and permitted their son-in-law to occupy
dwelling A under some purchase agreement. In 1928, the bank pro-
cured a judgment against the Reeds and the son-in-law and caused an
execution to be issued and the dwelling A to be sold, which was bought
in by the bank and sheriff's certificate of sale issued. The defendants
thereupon brought this action against the bank to assert their home-
stead rights to premises A. The lower court denied their homestead
exemption.
1. Under the homestead laws of Colorado the mere entering of
a homestead claim on the margin of the record of the real estate in the
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office of the County Clerk and Recorder is not in itself sufficient to
preserve the homestead exemption. There must be in addition to this
actual occupancy and continued occupancy by the husband or wife
claiming the exemption.
2. After the entry of such homestead exemption on the deed as
recorded in the office of the County Clerk and Recorder, such home-
stead right may be lost by abandonment of the dwelling as an actual
place of residence.
3. Where a husband or wife claims exemption as a homestead
of dwelling and real estate actually occupied as a homestead at the time
of causing such homestead exemption to be entered in the office of the
County Clerk and Recorder and thereafter the husband and wife take
up their abode in another dwelling and a judgment creditor seeks to
enforce a judgment against the homesteaded property, such a removal
and abandonment destroys any homestead exemption in the property.
-- Judgment affirmed.
DEEDS-REFORMATION-MISTAKE IN SERIES OF DEEDS-Heini vs.
Bank of Kremmling-No. 12941-Decided October 9, 1933-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
In 1908 Heini owned tracts A and B, which adjoined and each
contained 2 acres. He sold tract A to a creamery company, but through
mutual mistake tract B was described in the deed. The creamery took
possession of A and built a factory thereon. In October, 1908, de-
fendant bank, through its president, Heini, the grantor, made a loan
to the creamery and took a mortgage on A, but by mutual mistake,
described B. Foreclosure was had later, and the bank bought it in and
later received deed in 1919, which also contained the erroneous descrip-
tion. Heini died in 1919 and the bank discovered the error in 1928.
The heirs of Heini brought this suit against the bank claiming
title, and the bank answered claiming title and asking for reformation
of the deed. Court below granted relief to the defendant bank.
I. Where an error of description has been copied in a series of
deeds, under circumstances which would entitle each grantee to a refor-
mation as against his vendor, the last grantee will be entitled to a
reformation as against the original grantor.--Judgment affirmed.
WILLS-CONTEST-ORDER OF PROOF-INSTRUCTIONS-In re estate
of Wartenbee vs. The Pueblo Savings and Trust Co.-No. 12922
-Decided October 9, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
The coni-oversy is over the codicil of a will. No question was
raised on the will but the codicil was attacked for lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence. Codicil upheld by County Court and in
District Court verdict upheld codicil and contestants prosecute error
to this Court.
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1. Where contestants are not heirs but only related to deceased's
husband the usual instructions regarding "natural object of her bounty"
and "natural justice" are irrelevant.
2. In a will contest, the order of proof is in the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge and in the absence of a showing of prejudice or
abuse of discretion such order of proof would not constitute reversible
error even though not the regular order of proof.--Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PNEUMONIA CAUSED BY UNEXPECT-
ED EXPOSURE Is ACCIDENT WITH ACT-Industrial Commission
vs. Swanson-No. 13312-Decided October 9, 1933-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Swanson, a mine superintendent, contracted pneumonia from sud-
den and unexpected exposure, caused by accidental opening of a tunnel
door in mine, placed there to protect against down drafts from surface
shafts, and died as a result therefrom. The referee awarded compensa-
tion to his widow, which the Commission reversed without any addi-
tional evidence and the District Court reversed the Commission.
1. The deceased sustained an accident within the meaning of the
workmen's compensation law and his death resulted from accident aris-
ing out of and/or in the course of his employment.
2. The Commission was in error in holding as a matter of law,
the opening of the door, under the circumstances, did not constitute
such accident.--Judgment affirmed.
MINES-ADVERSE SUIT-INTERVENTION-Harding vs. Brayton-
No. 12905-Decided October 9, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
This was originally an adverse suit brought by Harvey against
Brayton to adjudicate rights of possession and rights to patent to min-
ing claim. After it was at issue, Harding intervened, Brayton demurred,
Harding elected to stand and to review judgment of dismissal, Harding
prosecutes this writ. Harding claims the right of possession to an
undivided one-fourth interest. He admits rights of Harvey and asks no
relief against Harvey but only against Brayton that patent issue to
him for his one-fourth interest or convey to him when patent issues
and for damages. Harding bought pendente lite.
1. Where one buys pendente lite and files no adverse claim in the
U. S. Land Office contesting application to patent by claimant, he took
subject to the rights of the litigants.
2. It appears from the record that the primary purpose of the
intervention was to support the action of plaintiff below who filed no
assignments of error and sued out no writ.
3. Harding was not entitled to intervene under these circum-
stances.--Judgment affirmed.
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REPLEVIN-PLEADING-ANSWER-NEW MATTER-Wyman vs. Mc-
Carthy-No. 12893-Decided October 9, 1933--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
In a replevin action, McCarthy recovered judgment against Wy-
man for the possession of 18 head of cattle, and for damages for unlaw-
ful detention. In one defense, Wyman denied that McCarthy was the
owner and entitled to possession, and for a further defense and by way
of counterclaim, Wyman alleged a joint adventure agreement between
them on the cattle and that these 18 head were sold to Wyman, the pur-
chase price to be deducted from Wyman's share of the profits, and that
an accounting would show plaintiff indebted to defendant. This fur-
ther defense and counterclaim was stricken and Wyman assigns error.
1. The allegations in the further answer were improper. They
did not constitute new matter.
2. Affirmative matter requiring a special plea must be in avoid-
ance. It is consistent with the plaintiff's cause of action, but operates to
defeat it.
3. If the matter pleaded in the answer is inconsistent with the
plaintiff's claim, its only effect is to disprove it, and it is admissible
under a general denial.
4. The counterclaim was properly stricken. It did not arise out
of the transaction set forth in the complaint nor was it connected with
the subject of the action.-Judgment affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Adams
filed a separate opinion concurring in affirmance of the judgment, but
dissenting on the construction of the rule of pleading, being of the
opinion that the matters set forth in defendant's answer under the head-
ing "Further Answer and Counterclaim" was an allegation of material
fact, which, if true, constituted a complete defense, and that the lower
Court erred in striking it, but as the same matters were in evidence and
permitted to be shown by the Court under general denial, that it was
error without prejudice.
TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS-FRATERNAL AND CHARITABLE USE OF
REAL ESTATE-VACANT LOTS-El Jebel Shrine Assn. vs. Mc-
Glone-No. 12771-Decided October 9, 1933--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Campbell.
Plaintiff-in-error, plaintiff below, filed complaint against the As-
sessor and Treasurer alleging that it was a holding corporation for
El Jebel Shrine Temple, a mutual, fraternal, benevolent and charitable
organization, that it is supported entirely from dues and entire proceeds
are devoted to fraternal and charitable purposes, that the property of
plaintiff is used solely for such purposes, that it acquired the real estate
for such purpose and that it had commenced the construction of a build-
ing on the lots by placing a building foundation thereon, which was
uncompleted at an expense of $50,000; that it acquired the lots ten
years before and that the lots were always exempted from taxation until
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1929 when the Assessor wrongfully placed them on the tax list and
levied a tax of over $1,100. Plaintiff claimed the real estate exempt
from taxation. The Court below sustained a geaneral demurrer, and
plaintiff stood upon the ruling.
1. Section 5 of Article X of Colorado Constitution provides:
"Lots, with the buildings thereon, if said buildings are used solely and
exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for strictly charitable
purposes * * * shall be exempt from taxation."
2. Such provision does not mean that such lots must hav* a
completed building thereon actually in use for charitable purposes.
3. A structure may be a building, although it is yet incomplete
and unfurnshed.
4. Where it appears that the lots in question were purchased with
the intent of devoting their use to charitable purposes and that a por-
tion of the building, which it proposes to use, has been commenced, and
that $50,000 has been expended toward the building of such structure,
and that the purpose is to complete the building and devote it to such
purposes, such real estate is exempt from taxation.--Judgment reversed.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY-The San Luis
Power and Water Company vs. Fred Trujillo--No. 13109-
Decided October 16, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
In April, 193 1, the County Treasurer filed this action to obtain a
declaratory judgment to the effect that the Sanchez reservoir and[ its
appurtenances, being the irrigation system of the water company, be
subject to taxation for the years 1907 to date. He alleged the corpora-
tive existence of the water company, that it was operated for profit, that
since 1907 it was the owner of water and water rights and that such
water and water rights had been omitted from assessment. The defense
was that the declaratory judgment act was unconstitutional, that the
landowners were furnished with the water, were assessed for taxes based
on the added value to the land by reason of being irrigable and this
would make double taxation and that, in any event, its water and water
rights could not be taxed under the statutory and constitutional pro-
hibitions against separate taxation of irrigated works.
Judgment below for plaintiff.
1. The declaratory judgments act is constitutional.
2. The taxes on defendant's property have not been assessed and
paid by the owners of the lands irrigated from its system because the
lands have been assessed at a valuation on account of being irrigated
lands.
3. The terms of the contract between the irrigation company and
the landowners show that the landowners have no right, title or interest
in the water or the water works system except as a consumer. The
ownership of this irrigation system, its water and water rights being
in the water company, it is separately taxable and does not fall within
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the exemption of the constitution that "ditches, canals and flumes
owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land
owned by such individuals or corporations, or the individual members
thereof, shall not be separately taxed so long as they shall be ow~ned
and used exclusively for such purposes. -- Judgment affirmed.
BILLS AND NOTES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DISCHARGE IN
BANKRUPTCY-Lieske vs. Swan-No. 13387-Decided October
16, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
This was a suit on a promissory note to which the defenses were
the statute of limitations and discharge in bankruptcy. Jury was waived
and case tried by the Court which found for plaintiff. Defendants be-
low prosecute error.
1. Error cannot be predicated on the Court below allowing filing
of replication out of time. This is in the discretion of the Court.
2. Error cannot be predicated on Court reserving ruling on mo-
tion for judgment on the pleas. This is discretionary with the Court.
3. Trial Court's conclusion on conflicting testimony is binding.
4. Dispute was as to whether or not an interest payment had
been made, taking the note out of the Statute of Limitations. Findings
on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.
5. A discharge in bankruptcy is no defense where bankrupt
promised to pay a note notwithstanding the bankruptcy proceedings.
The moral obligation to pay such a debt is sufficient to support a
promise to pay notwithstanding the discharge, whether the promise be
oral or written, and whether, if made after the filing of the petition,
it be made before or after discharge.--Judgment affirmed.
AGENCY -CONTRACTS - PLEADNG - EVIDENCE - SEGREGATION OF
WITNESSES-The Union Deposit Co. vs. Driscoll-No. 12827
-Decided October 16, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mary Driscoll brought an action as plaintiff in the District Court
for damages for breach of contract. Plaintiff prevailed below.
1. Where a corporation contracts with "A" for exclusive agency
for sale of its bonds and "A" employs salesmen to sell such bonds and
where such contract of agency authorized the employment of subagents
to deal for the company, such subagent is the agent of the company.
2. By answering over, any error in overruling motion or de-
murrer is waived, except as to questions of a jurisdiction and insuf-
ficiency of the alleged facts.
3. Where, at the request of a defendant, witnesses are segregated,
such defendant cannot complain of an order of the Court refusing to
permit a witness of the defendant, a handwriting expert, to remain in
the court room.
4. Where a subagent of a company sells both for the company
and takes a power of attorney to himself from the purchaser, such act
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does not necessarily terminate his agency for the company and make him
the agent of the purchaser, particularly where the power of attorney
was unknown to the company at the time the transaction occurred and
where the power of attorney had no connection with the transaction of
selling the bonds.--Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXCISE TAX AND PROPERTY
TAX-Walker vs. Bedford et al.-No. 13380-Decided October
24, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Walker brought this action to enjoin the enforcement of Chap-
ter 14, Session Laws of the Extraordinary Session of 1933, commonly
known as the UR tax. Its constitutionality was attacked on several
grounds, the principal ones being that it was not an excise tax but
was an additional property tax and was in conflict with Sections 3 and
7 of Article 10 of the Colorado Constitution. Demurrer to complaint
was sustained below.
1. Section 3 of Article 10 of our constitution provides among
other things that "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."
2. Section 7, Article 10 provides among other things that "The
general assembly shall not impose taxes for the purposes of any county,
city, town or other municipal corporation."
3. The act in question imposes a property tax and is not an
excise tax.
4. The general assembly is not at liberty to impose a property
tax upon the theory that it is imposing an excise tax,
5. While a license tax may be levied upon such business or oc-
cupations as are proper subjects of municipal regulation and control
and the purpose of such tax is for regulation or restraint, yet when
all the elements of regulation or restraint are wanting, and the primary
purpose of the act is the raising of revenue only, it then loses its character
as a license tax and becomes a tax for revenue.
6. Where the primary purpose of the act is to tax automobiles
from which fund the needy and destitute may receive aid it comes
within the prohibitions of Section 7, Article 10, of our constitution.
-Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Butler, Mi. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Holland dissent.
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